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1 
Introduction 
Banks owned by foreign strategic owners have been present in Hungary since the mid-1980s 
and, as a result of the large-scale bank privatisation in the mid-1990s, the lion’s share of the 
Hungarian banking system was acquired by foreign strategic owners. The effects of this 
process have been the subject of numerous studies. Ábel and Szakadát (1997) focus on the 
structural transformation of the banking system in the 1990s and the related costs. The 
authors conclude that the transformation of the banking system was successful overall, but 
that its pace was too sluggish, leading to additional costs. Hence, had large banks been 
pushed into carrying out structural transformations at the very beginning of the 1990s, 
consolidation costs would have been lower. Várhegyi (1998) examines the Hungarian 
banking system’s ownership structure. The study comes to the major conclusion that, by 
allowing foreign banks entry and participation in bank privatisation, the Hungarian banking 
system’s operation resembled that of developed countries in many aspects by the end of the 
1990s. Mérő and Valentinyi (2003) reach a similar conclusion after examining the role of the 
appearance of foreign banks in central and eastern Europe. Várhegyi (2002) explains in 
detail the development of the banking system following the transition by presenting the 
transformation and business strategy of individual banks. Király et al (2007) examine the 
Hungarian banking system’s corporate governance structure. The study reveals that the 
murky, fragmented nature of state ownership is the source of severe management problems. 
Numerous studies have also been written on the Hungarian features of the 2007 global 
financial crisis and its effects on the banking system. From October 2008, following the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, Hungary was affected by a severe financial/liquidity crisis, 
which threatened to paralyse the entire financial system, followed by a deep recession. The 
Hungarian banking system’s reaction to the global financial and economic crisis has also 
been presented from numerous perspectives. Király et al (2008) deal mainly with contagion 
channels, highlighting the role of risk premia and two-way contagion channels between 
parent banks and subsidiaries. Várhegyi (2008) attributes Hungary’s and its banking 
system’s high vulnerability to external balance problems and substantial credit expansion. 
Király (2008) presents the Hungarian banking system’s pre- and post-Lehman period from a 
liquidity perspective. According to the study, the crisis could have been prevented with 
restrictions and limitations in all cases where an apparent excess of liquidity led to irrational 
results, such as disproportionately high leverage, asset price bubbles financed by credit 
growth and banking systems supported solely by external financing, operating with 
excessively high loan-to-deposit ratios. Banai et al (2009) analyse the behaviour of European 
banking groups exposed to the central-eastern European region and conclude that, contrary 
to the fear of foreign investors, the outflow in parent bank financing remained modest during 
the crisis. 
A number of studies have thus dealt with the effects of privatisation, the performance of 
banks acquired by foreign strategic owners and those having chosen other paths, as well as 
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the effects of the 2007 crisis on the banking system.
2 However, to the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first paper to examine the asymmetries in the behaviour of the two main strategic 
groups of the Hungarian banking system in the pre- and post-Lehman period. 
From the perspective of the events which occurred in Hungary, we consider October 2008 as 
the starting point of the crisis. We will compare the performance of two groups of banks: 
“foreign” and “local”. “Foreign banks”
3 include institutions in which foreign strategic investors 
acquired majority ownership primarily in the course of privatisation in the 1990s. “Local 
banks”
4  include banks held in majority by domestic (state) investors,  or held in shares 
scattered among owners on the stock market, ie where privatisation by foreign strategic 
investors was avoided. We are aware of the fact that the “foreign” and “local” groups are 
highly heterogeneous,
5 but the present paper does not aim to elucidate this heterogeneity, 
focusing instead on the differences in behaviour between the two groups. 
The first half of the paper examines in detail the performance of banks from the end of the 
1990s until the onset of the financial crisis in October 2008. In the early 2000s, increasing 
retail credit market competition
6 among foreign and local banks determined the similarities or 
differences in strategy. “Local banks” began their expansion in eastern Europe at that time, 
thereby competing not only with the subsidiaries but also with the parent banks of “foreign” 
banks. During this period, the balance sheets of the two groups were characterised by rapid 
credit expansion, high profitability and the emergence of liquidity and credit risks. 
In the second half of the paper we focus on the divergent behaviour of banks during the 
global financial crisis. Following the onset of the crisis in Hungary in October 2008, all banks 
faced a radically altered financial and macroeconomic environment and had to adapt to the 
new conditions. With regard to this period, we concentrate on examining whether the 
                                                  
2   The banking system includes all the banks, branches and specialised financial institutions except for Keler, 
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2006 – which was established through the merger of Hypovereinsbank and Bank Austria Creditanstalt), 
Unicredit Jelzálogbank (HVB Jelzálogbank until November 2006), Volksbank and Westdeutsche Landesbank. 
The group of foreign banks also includes the following foreign branches: Axa branch (formerly Ella, then Axa 
Bank), Banco Primus branch, Bank Sal Oppenheim, BNP-Paribas branch (formerly BNP-Dresdner then BNP-
Paribas Bank), Calyon SA branch (formerly Credit Lyonnais then Calyon Bank), Citibank branch (formerly 
Citibank), Cofidis branch, Fortis branch, ING branch (formerly ING Bank) and Oberbank branch. 
4   In the investigated period (1999–2009), the group of local banks includes OTP Bankgroup (OTP Bank, OTP 
Mortgagebank, Merkantilbank and OTP Lakástakarékpénztár), FHB Bankgroup (FHB Mortgagebank and FHB 
Bank), the Postabank (until 2004), Magyar Takarékszövetkezeti Bank and ELLA Első Lakáshitel Kereskedelmi 
Bank. Despite the small number of banks, the overall market share of this group exceeded 30% of the total 
assets of the banking system in 2008. 
5   Privatisation  unquestionably  represents a behavioural change in a bank’s operations: nevertheless, we 
consider the difference between banks owned by foreign strategic owners and those without such ownership 
more significant than the difference between state-owned banks and those with ownership dispersed through 
the Hungarian stock exchange. 
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different ownership structures and the various pre-crisis strategies required diverse crisis 
management practices. 
I.  “Foreign” and “local” banks before the crisis 
The consolidation of the banking system during the transition and the establishment of 
market-based operations were part of Hungary’s economic transformation. While the 
institutional framework of a market economy was established, the earlier one-tier banking 
system was transformed into a two-tier system as part of the market reforms, while an 
increasing number of foreign strategic owners were entering the market and the proportion of 
indirectly state-owned banks was increasing. 
I.1.   Retrospection: the evolution of the current ownership structure 
In 1990, the proportion of foreign strategic ownership in the Hungarian banking system was a 
mere 5%, although it was constantly rising with the successive entries of “greenfield” – 
primarily Austrian, Italian, German and Benelux – banks. Nevertheless, mass privatisation 
only got under way following the collapse of the banking system in 1993. 
The state loan, debtor and subsequent bank consolidation programmes implemented after 
the 1993 banking crisis improved somewhat the portfolio and capital position of majority 
state-owned credit institutions. The fact that state assets were insufficient to manage the 
accumulated problems (Ábel and Szakadát (1997)) facilitated the acceleration of the 
privatisation process from 1994. Privatisation with the participation of foreign owners was a 
necessity, arising from the deficiency of internal capital accumulation (Szapáry (2001)). On 
the other hand, sales to foreign strategic investors were justified by the anticipated 
“knowledge import”. In the early 2000s, the ownership share of foreign banks in the 
Hungarian banking system reached a level of around 70% (Chart 1). 
Chart 1 
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Note: We considered the OTP group as entirely domestic-owned. 
Sources: Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB), PSZÁF. 198  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
Expansion towards the east was part of western European banks’ long-term strategy during 
the era of mass privatisation. The basic assumption was that Hungary, after getting through 
its transitional crisis, would continuously converge with western European countries and 
display rapid economic growth and, thus, rapid revenue growth. At the outset, foreign banks 
appeared primarily in the corporate segment, which required lower initial investment, and did 
not represent fierce competition in the retail segment until the early 2000s (Móré and Nagy 
(2004)). The entry of foreign banks into the retail segment was limited by numerous factors 
besides the inherited competitive edge of local banks. One such entry barrier was 
information asymmetry, which characterised household lending due to the short credit history 
of Hungarian households. This problem affected local banks to a lesser extent, as their 
continuous participation provided them with far more information about customers. The other 
important factor lies in the special needs of the household segment. In order to reach and 
adequately serve potential clients, a far more extensive branch network and staff capacity 
was needed compared to the corporate segment. The associated high costs prevented 
foreign banks from entering this market or from strengthening their presence for a long time. 
Due to the retail market’s high entry costs, foreign banks focused initially on the corporate 
segment. Expansion in the corporate segment was supported by the arrival of multinational 
firms, the appearance of similar “home-host” relations in the corporate segment and an 
upswing in external trade. Moreover, foreign banks, which did not inherit low-quality 
corporate portfolios from the pre-transition period and had experience in the field of 
commercial banking, could thus offer, overall, more favourable conditions to customers than 
their domestic competitors (Chart 2.) 
Chart 2 
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Thus, foreign banks gained ground within the Hungarian banking system following the 
transition, first as greenfield investors, then as privatisers. The major players were the 
Austrian banks Raiffeisen, Erste and Creditanstalt, the Italian banks Intesa and Unicredito, 
the German bank BLB and the Belgian bank KBC (and, before that, the Dutch bank ABN 
Amro). 
However, OTP, the “national champion”, was not sold to foreign strategic investors, but 
instead privatised in 1995 via an initial public offering on the stock market. FHB Bank, 
founded in 1997 and with a main profile of mortgage-backed lending, was also kept from 
foreign acquisition by being privatised on the stock market in 2003, similarly to OTP. These 
two banking groups became the most significant players among the banks that have never 
been owned by a major strategic investor.  
I.2.   The credit boom on the retail market: non price-based competition 
The end of the 1990s saw a change in the attitude of foreign banks. As the profitability of the 
corporate segment began to dwindle due to fierce competition, banks were more inclined to 
turn towards the retail segment. Meanwhile, households exhibited an increasing demand for 
bank products as a consequence of improving income growth prospects. 
Throughout the entire pre-crisis period, “price-based competition” between banks was low.
7 
Although local banks applied higher interest in the case of loans and lower interest in the 
case of deposits than their foreign competitors, the banking system as a whole was 
characterised by oligopolistic pricing (Várhegyi (2003), Krekó et al (2006), Horváth et al 
(2007)). Banks’ behaviour may have been influenced by the fact that Hungarian customers’ 
price sensitivity was low (Horváth, et al (2007)) and, therefore, price was not the most 
important factor in the acquisition of new customers. The business policy of banks was 
based on acquiring more customers at the price of higher costs or risks rather than by 
charging lower prices. This is supported by the fact that margins on retail loan products 
remained around twice as high as in the euro area over the entire period (Chart 3). 
                                                  
7   In the early 2000s, HUF-denominated state-subsidised housing loans were the major type of credit granted to 
households. The interest rate on housing loans and banks’ interest margin were not set by market 


























































































































































































































































Foreign banks Local banks
 
Note: We deducted the three-month CHF Libor from the APR of domestic retail mortgage loans and deducted 
the three-month Euribor from euro area housing loan interest rates. 
Source: MNB. 
Therefore, a different set of instruments emerged in customer acquisition. In the first phase 
of competition, priority was given to the expansion of sales channels – banks’ marketing 
activity, networks and employee numbers thus grew substantially, as did the costs of this 
rapid expansion. In this so-called “cost-based competition”, there was a great discrepancy 
between local and foreign banks. Local banks had a competitive edge in the market 
compared to foreign banks, stemming from strong retail customer relationships, large branch 
networks and the establishment of mortgage banks. Mortgage banks refinanced banks within 
their group or other foreign banks. Thanks to this competitive edge, local banks did not take 
part in the rush to open branches and continued operating with the same number of 
employees and network units. Moreover, although marketing costs also increased 
substantially within this group, they nevertheless represented a much smaller proportion of 
local banks’ operating costs in comparison to foreign banks (Chart 4). Despite less active 
cost-based competition, the initial strong market position of local banks allowed them to 
sustain their leading role in the competition of state-subsidised HUF loans. BIS Papers No 54  201
 
 
Chart 4  
























































































































































Local banks Foreign banks
 
Source: MNB. 
By contrast, foreign banks launched strong cost-based competition. Marketing costs rose 
sharply and the number of branches and ATMs, as well as the number of employees, 
increased. As competition intensified, foreign banks acquired a substantial market share in 
the mortgage loan segment but did not succeed in dethroning local banks from their market-
leading position
8 (Chart 5). 
                                                  
8   By increasing the number of branches, foreign banks obviously also strived to break into the deposit market in 
addition to selling loan products. Although the costs of entry were highest in this area, competition was also 










































































































































































Foreign banks Local banks
Privatisation of Posta Bank
Privatisation of Posta Bank
 
Source: MNB. 
State subsidies of HUF-denominated housing loans were significantly cut back in 2003. 
Competition for retail customers thus took a new turn due to the drop in sales of HUF-
denominated mortgage loan constructions. “Risk-based competition” emerged in parallel to 
“cost-based competition” and triggered a shift towards increasingly risky products and 
customers. The first sign of this was the appearance of FX-denominated loans.
9 
FX-denominated loans first appeared in 2001 in relation to financial enterprises, mainly in the 
field of vehicle purchase financing. The expansion of FX-denominated vehicle loans surfaced 
primarily among the financial enterprises of foreign-owned banks. Between 2001 and 2004, 
the ratio of financial enterprise financing compared to the balance sheet totals of owner 
banks tripled. By 2005, the ratio had reached 11% of the balance sheet totals of foreign 
banks and, despite the substantial rearrangement of banks’ balance sheets as a result of the 
retail credit boom, it remained at around 8% prior to the crisis (Chart 6). 
                                                  



































































































































Ratio of FX funding
Credit granted by foreign banks to financial enterprises as a percentage of total assets (right-hand scale)  
Note: The chart displays loans to financial enterprises as a percentage of banks’ total assets and the 
denomination structure of this credit. 
Source: MNB. 
The popularity of FX lending did not remain confined to vehicle financing. With the drop in 
state-subsidised HUF-denominated housing loans, FX, particularly CHF-denominated 
financing, became predominant among mortgage – initially housing, then home equity – 
loans from the beginning of 2004. Until the onset of the crisis, such loans remained the main 
credit product of banks. 
In the case of FX-denominated vehicle and mortgage loans, foreign banks were leaders, 
while local banks were followers. In retail mortgage lending, the ratio of FX loans began to 
increase as early as the beginning of 2004 among foreign banks, while this process only 






































































































































































































































































































As one of the final chapters of risk-based competition, yen-denominated loans appeared as a 
new product in the shadow of the crisis. While foreign banks were unequivocally the ones to 
push CHF-denominated collateralised loans, in the case of yen-denominated loans, the 
“initiative” was local. Yen-denominated loans quickly became popular among households 
that were completely unaware of exchange rate risks, as these products were accessible 
with even lower instalments than CHF-denominated loans. 
Besides the spread of FX lending, numerous other factors reflected the intensification of risk-
based competition. Banks constantly eased their credit conditions and standards (MNB 
survey on banks’ lending practices 2004–2008). The formerly conservative collateral 
requirements were continually loosened and banks applied high loan-to-value (LTV) ratios for 
an increasing proportion of loans.
10 Whereas at the end of 2004 the banking system’s 
average LTV ratio for housing loans was only 50%, by the end of 2008 this ratio was 
approaching 70%. Furthermore, several banks registered significantly higher payment-to-
income (PTI) ratios (between 2004 and 2008, households’ debt service burden to their 
income increased from 8% to 13%). Finally, in 2007–2008, banks relied increasingly on 
agents – a significantly more efficient sales channel compared to branches. More than 50% 
of the mortgage loans granted in 2007 were sold through agents. Although agents 
significantly improved access to bank products, loans granted via their intermediation were 
characterised by default rates two to three times higher than those sold in branches.
11 
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The  cost-  and risk-based competition referred to above transformed the structure of the 
market. The substantial advantage of local banks in the retail segment eroded, while foreign 
banks gained ground. Between 1999 and 2009, concentration among retail products fell most 
rapidly in the case of retail deposits and mortgage loans. In 2008, the HHI (Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index) level of mortgage loans was only barely higher than that of the corporate 
credit market (Chart 8). Nevertheless, local banks succeeded in reinforcing their leading 
market position, as their market share still surpassed 30% in retail products.  
Chart 8 




















Total assets Retail deposits Corporate loans
Retail unsecured loans Retail mortgage loans
 
Note: In the case of collateralised retail loans, we consider the 2001 emergence of the market as the starting 
point. 
Source: MNB. 
I.3.   The consequences of high margins: high profitability and strong capital 
position 
As a consequence of non-price-based competition for customers and the expansion of loans 
stemming from the growth of the economy, the profitability of the Hungarian banking system 
was considered outstandingly high over the past 10 years, not only in the region, but in the 
whole of Europe. Foreign banks not only benefited from the high profitability but also 
contributed to the economic boom and to even higher profitability. The profitability of the 
Hungarian banking system surpassed the performance of that of the parent bank countries 
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Sources: OECD, MNB. 
The profitability of the Hungarian and western European banking systems differs not only in 
terms of scale, but also in terms of composition. Within the western European banking 
system, the main source of revenue is non-interest income. In contrast, the main source of 
revenue in the Hungarian banking system is the high interest income stemming from high 
interest margins. The efficiency of the banking system and the result of financial operations 
are lower, while the portfolio risk and the resulting credit losses are higher than in euro area 
banking groups.  
In the course of the past 10 years, the return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) of 
local banks were almost twice as high as those of foreign banks (Chart 10). The ROE and 
ROA indicators – reflecting the profitability trend of the banking system – peaked at the end 
of 2004 in the case of foreign banks and have gradually dropped since then. In the case of 
local banks, profitability only peaked at the end of 2005 at a very high level, and plummeted 
sharply thereafter. Local banks – whose profit advantages were mainly based on the 
inherited, very broad retail customer base – consistently outperformed their foreign rivals 
from the end of the 1990s. Thanks to customers’ low sensitivity to loan and deposit margins, 
the higher margins and fee income realised by the local banks maintained a significantly 
higher interest and commission income level than that of foreign banks. Expensive account 
management fees and payment charges also contributed to the higher commission and fee 
income. The income difference was only slightly mitigated by the fact that the profit realised 
by foreign banks on financial operations was higher all along than that of local banks due to 
their more active treasury and custodian activities. BIS Papers No 54  207
 
 
Chart 10  
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Local banks Foreign banks
 
Source: MNB. 
In terms of expenses, provisions at foreign and local banks were almost the same over the 
10-year period. This is attributable to the fact that, although the portfolio quality of local banks 
was better, their coverage with provision was significantly higher than that of foreign-owned 
banks, ie they calculated a higher provision for a better quality portfolio. For example, in the 
case of household loans, the coverage with provision of local banks exceeded 40%, while 
the coverage of foreign banks was around 30% in the third quarter of 2009. However, a 
significant change took place in relation to operating expenses in the course of the past 10 
years. While foreign banks’ operating costs were higher than those of local banks until 2003, 
this situation reversed from 2004. The underlying reason can be attributed to the change in 
competitiveness. Since foreign banks had gained a greater market share, local banks were 
forced to spend increasing amounts on new technologies and the appropriate expertise 
(“negative spillover effect”) in order to improve their competitive position. This largely 
contributed to the convergence of foreign and local banks’ competitiveness. Later, though, 
the costs of foreign banks increased as local banks proved to be more competitive in selling 
retail products (“positive spillover effect”) thanks to their strengthened market position and 
extensive branch network. Foreign banks’ budgets were heavily burdened by the expansion 
of their networks (both branches and ATMs). 208  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
Chart 11  






















Local banks (excluding domestic subsidiaries) Foreign banks
 
Source: MNB. 
Of the profit realised in Hungary, 30–40% was repatriated by foreign banks, boosting the 
profits of parent banks. The other part of the profit – 60–70% (Chart 11) – was reinvested, 
which significantly contributed to subsidiary banks’ sufficient capital adequacy and to 
sustaining their future growth and resulting high profits. The main source of local banks’ high 
capital adequacy was also attributable to internal capital accumulation. In the period under 
review, the rate of reinvested profit was around 70–80%. 
I.4.   The price of sustaining high profitability: the emergence of liquidity and credit 
risks 
The country’s net foreign debt as a percentage of GDP quadrupled in the 10 years to 2008. 
Due to the overindebtedness of the public and private sectors, net external financial 
requirements were significant in every year. The majority of foreign funds flowed in through 
the financial intermediary system. From these foreign funds, the banking system primarily 
financed the loans taken out by the private sector and, to a lesser extent, the issuance of 
government securities. Government securities were financed for the most part by direct 
foreign purchases of assets. 
During this period, global money markets were characterised by ample liquidity and cheap, 
easily accessible funding. At the same time, returns realised on investments dropped 
substantially in the years preceding the crisis leading to a hunt for yield and an increased risk 
appetite. One form of this was the central and eastern European expansion of banks, 
financed partly through capital investments and partly by the active refinancing of local 
affiliates. All of this essentially means that, over recent years, the savings of European parent 
banks acquired from the capital markets of different regions around the world have financed 
Hungary’s convergence and the rapid loan expansion entailed by strong non-price-based 
competition. BIS Papers No 54  209
 
 
Increasing funding risks are clearly indicated by the fact that, while the bank loan portfolio of 
households nearly tripled between 2004 and 2008, their bank deposits increased by only 
slightly over 40% during the same period. The loan portfolio of the private sector doubled in 
the same period, while deposits lagged far behind. Consequently, the loan-to-deposit ratio of 
foreign banks within the banking system already exceeded 100% in 2000 and continued to 
rise sharply with the escalation of lending, peaking at 180% at the end of 2008 (Chart 12). A 
total of 60–70% of the funds involved came from parent banks, while 30–40% was raised on 
the capital markets. Due to their size and superior credit rating, parent banks have access to 
funds with better conditions; subsequently, many banking groups’ funding is centralised. 
Chart 12 
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Foreign banks Local banks
 
Source: MNB. 
The loan-to-deposit ratio at local banks was still very low at the end of the 1990s, falling 
below 50%. A total of 54% of retail savings was concentrated in this group of local banks, 
enabling them to finance the expansion of corporate lending until 2004 from their existing 
stable retail deposits, and subsequently to expand their vehicle loans and retail mortgages 
from 2000 through financial enterprises. However, the deposit growth rate could not keep 
pace with the loan expansion rate. Furthermore, the largest local bank began its regional 
expansion in the early 2000s. Hence, from 2004, local banks were also forced to turn 
increasingly to international funding. At that point, the loan-to-deposit ratio (LDR) exceeded 
100% and continued to increase, peaking at around 130% at the end of 2008. The LDR of 
local banks, exclusive of the funds provided for their foreign subsidiaries, only just surpassed 
100%, even in 2008 (110% in December 2008). 210  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
Chart 13  






























































































































































































Foreign banks Local banks
 
Source: MNB. 
After accumulating huge amounts of FX-denominated assets (Chart 13), banks closed their 
open FX positions in the balance sheet with off-balance sheet swaps. Between 2003 and 
2007, the ratio of FX swaps to the balance sheet total fluctuated between 5 and 10% at 
foreign banks, while for local banks, this ratio did not even reach 5%; until autumn 2007 they 
secured foreign currency not by utilising their HUF liquidity through FX swaps, but rather by 
employing cheap, longer-term international funds (Chart 14). 
Chart 14  
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Finally, it was not only funding risks but also liquidity risks on the asset side that increased 
(Chart 15). As a result of the credit expansion, the volume of liquid assets continuously 
decreased within the domestic banking system. This was especially evident in the case of 
local banks, where the ratio of liquid assets to the balance sheet total dropped from 50% to 
5% between 2001 and 2007. 
Chart 15 



















































































































































































































Local banks Foreign banks
 
Source: MNB. 
Liquidity risks were already evident prior to the onset of the crisis in 2008. As a result of 
turbulence in the international money markets in August 2007, cheap, long-term maturity 
international funds gradually disappeared, and short-term money market swaps played an 
increasingly important role in the financing of FX-denominated long-term loans through the 
utilisation of liquid assets. 
Non-price-based competition – with the objective of continuously expanding the market 
position – thus resulted in a strong increase in liquidity risks. As a consequence of an LDR 
considered high even by international standards, the banking system became increasingly 
reliant on international funds. International interbank funds are typically short-term and a less 
stable form of financing than retail deposits. All of this entails high renewal risk (“maturity 
mismatch”). Moreover, as far as maturity mismatch is concerned, heavy reliance on the FX 
swap market also poses a key risk factor. In the event of disruption in the international 
interbank market and the FX swap market, liquidity tensions may arise. Moreover, if a bank is 
unable to renew its FX swap deals, then the foreign currency should be purchased on the 
spot market, which can in turn lead to substantial exchange rate fluctuations and a widening 
in the on-balance sheet net open position (on-balance sheet “currency mismatch”). 
Although local banks’ LDR was substantially lower than that of foreign banks, their renewal 
risk was nevertheless higher. On the one hand, foreign banks had access to parent banks’ 
funding, which had a stabilising effect due to the owners’ long-term commitment. On the 
other hand, when the crisis unfolded, local banks had higher FX swap market exposures 212  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
than foreign banks. Finally, the small liquid assets portfolio also increased the liquidity risks 
of local banks. 
Due to the risk-based competition of banks prior to the crisis, not only liquidity risks but also 
substantial credit risks accumulated, primarily on the retail market.  
Chart 16 
The correlation between retail lending and the main real economic aggregates 



































































































































































































































































































Share of FX loans as a percentage of total household debt
Total household debt as a percentage of GDP
 
Source: MNB. 
Over recent years, the fact that retail customers’ borrowings in FX had lax credit conditions 
and that exchange rates seemed relatively stable (concealing the actual exchange rate risks) 
significantly contributed to the indebtedness of households (“retail capital mismatch”
12). 
Excessive indebtedness is also reflected by the fact that the repayment burden of Hungarian 
households amounted to 13% of their disposable income, while the consumption rate was 
above 90% in 2008 (Chart 16). Both values exceeded the average for the euro area, while 
the ratio of retail loans to GDP (40%) remained well below average. The high indebtedness 
ensuing from a lower household income path and a lower household savings ratio clearly 
indicates an increasing credit risk. 
Credit risk is also generated by passing on exchange rate risks (retail “currency mismatch”). 
While in 2004, the household sector did not have any net open exchange rate positions, by 
the end of 2008 the sector’s GDP-proportionate net position reached 20%. As a result of this 
open position, a substantial exchange rate depreciation would considerably deteriorate the 
portfolio of commercial banks, quickly turning the exchange rate risk of customers into a 
credit risk of banks. 
                                                  
12   IMF (2003): The Balance Sheet Approach and its Applications at the Fund. BIS Papers No 54  213
 
 
Over the last decade, the credit risks of both foreign and local banks increased substantially. 
Nonetheless, the credit risk level of local banks can be regarded as relatively lower, as 
suggested by the lower rate of loans in default for over 90 days.
13 
II.   Adjustment during the crisis 
As we have seen, the Hungarian banking system generated an outstandingly high profit level 
over the past 10 years. This high profitability was sustained at the cost of assuming both 
increasing credit risk necessitated by risk-based competition and increasing liquidity risk in 
order to fund such growth. These risks materialised as a consequence of the financial and 
subsequent economic crisis, and it has since become obvious that such high profitability 
cannot be sustained over the long term. 
The period following the outbreak of the crisis can be split into two clearly distinct phases: 
liquidity risk emerged in the first phase (final quarter of 2008) to be followed by credit risk in 
the second phase (2009–10). 
Although funding costs had been increasing in Hungary since August 2007 at the outbreak of 
the international financial crisis and it had become increasingly difficult to obtain long-term 
funding, the liquidity crisis only really began in Hungary in the post-Lehman era, ie following 
the events of October 2008. As a result of the dramatic narrowing of financing opportunities, 
the financial crisis threatened Hungary with a balance of payments crisis ensuing from the 
substantial public and private sector indebtedness. As a consequence of the country’s 
significant need for international funding and the related extreme vulnerability, the exchange 
rate depreciated substantially as a result of the crisis, and key financial markets (mainly 
government securities, FX swap and interbank markets) dried up. 
A number of steps were taken in order to manage the liquidity crisis. To protect itself against 
an exchange rate attack, the central bank raised its base rate by 300 basis points while also 
deciding to take on a number of measures aimed at expanding liquidity and stabilising the 
market: it operated the swap market, assumed the role of lender of last resort both in HUF 
and EUR, expanded the scope of acceptable collateral, announced HUF and FX credit 
tenders, cut its mandatory reserve rate and ensured that money markets remained 
operational. In order to ensure state financing and to replenish its diminished FX reserves, 
within three weeks the state reached an agreement with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and with the European Union on a EUR 20 billion loan package. All of this contributed 
significantly to foreign investors’ increased confidence. 
The second wave of the crisis came in March 2009. During that period, it was not purely a 
country-specific but rather a region-specific problem that emerged, prompting foreign 
investors to quickly sell their assets. Due to the substantial contraction of regional economies 
and the high proportion of FX lending, the banking system’s credit losses increased sharply, 
which in turn increased the threat of financial instability. Due to uncertainties surrounding the 
state of the banking systems, the currency exchange rate of several countries depreciated 
substantially, while in the Baltic countries the likelihood of abandoning the currency board 
and the pegged exchange rate system posed a real threat. This resulted not only in a loss of 
investor confidence, but also shook the confidence of households which manifested itself in 
the rapid, temporary outflow of deposits from the banking system. Confidence in central and 
eastern European countries was restored thanks to improving global economic prospects, 
                                                  
13   Local banks’ regional expansion clearly increases lending risk. However, in this study, we focus mainly on the 
domestic operations of banks, as they show a different picture on a group level in connection with the foreign 
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the successful foreign currency bond issuances of regional states and the better-than-
expected shock absorbing capacity of the banking systems. 
Between April and December 2009, confidence in the region and hence in Hungary, 
gradually improved, credit default swap (CDS) spreads decreased significantly, and money 
markets stabilised. The greatest challenge for the banking system was the continued balance 
sheet adjustment and the absorption of credit losses triggered by the deteriorating 
macroeconomic environment. 
II.1.   Liquidity – during the crisis 
In the period following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, nearly all investors fled from 
markets deemed to be risky. Due to the international money market turmoil and the high 
vulnerability stemming from the country’s substantial external financing requirements, 
domestic CDS premia and government security yields increased significantly. Important 
domestic markets dried up (Chart 17). The interbank, FX, swap and government security 
markets experienced severe disruption. Besides state financing, the financing of the banking 
system was also threatened. The most important liquidity problem was how the Hungarian 
banking system, characterised by high FX claims, would secure adequate FX liquidity. It 
wasn’t the price that mattered anymore, but rather the volume, due to the fact that interbank 
limits set very low – often at zero – price offers which had no significance. 
Chart 17 
CDS premia on certain foreign banks with a prominent role in Hungary  









































































































































































































5 year CDS spread of Hungary
 
Sources: Bloomberg, Reuters, Thomson Datastream. 
The international financial package, the liquidity provisioning measures of the central bank 
and the intervention of foreign parent banks played a key role in solving the problem. Without 
any parent banks to fall back on, local banks relied increasingly on central bank and state 
bailout packages. On the one hand, the rolling over of a substantial FX-swap stock became BIS Papers No 54  215
 
 
difficult due to the drying up of the market and in turn due to narrowing partner limits (Chart 
18). On the other hand, the rolling over of the increasing FX-swap stock required ever 
greater HUF liquidity, made almost impossible by the dwindling liquidity of the interbank 
market. Consequently, local banks were only able to obtain the required FX liquidity from the 
central bank. This was technically achieved by transforming the HUF liquidity provided by the 
central bank into FX liquidity through FX swaps which were also provided by the central 
bank. 
Chart 18 
Daily developments in the FX swap stock as a percentage  




























































































































































Stock as a percentage of total assets (foreign banks)
Stock as a percentage of total assets (local banks)
 
Source: MNB. 
The FX liquidity position of foreign banks also deteriorated substantially, although parent 
banks assumed a key role in managing this problem (Chart 19). As markets for FX liquidity 
dried up, the subsidiaries of foreign banks operating in Hungary increasingly relied on their 
parent institutions for the necessary funding. In the final quarter of 2008, parent banks 
increased the funding of their subsidiaries by nearly EUR 3 billion in order to make them 
more resistant to the liquidity crisis. The role of parent banks also became more dominant on 
the FX swap market in ensuring FX liquidity. 216  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
Chart 19  



























































































































































Ratio of funds from parent bank in total foreign funds
Ratio of intra group swaps in total swap stock
 
Source: MNB. 
Rapid, large-scale action by the banks also contributed to the alleviation of the liquidity crisis. 
As a result of the financial crisis and the economic recession, the real economic sector 
scaled back its indebtedness and, consequently, the banking system’s leverage, more 
precisely, the loan-to-deposit ratio, also decreased. The liquidity crisis, however, accelerated 
the scale and speed of deleveraging. Banks themselves recognised that the earlier credit 
expansion was unsustainable, and thus the era of risk-based competition came to an end. 
Initially, liquidity considerations – followed by a deterioration in portfolios – led to a drastic 
drop in risk appetite, which was reflected in a low willingness to lend. Decreasing the LDR 
and the reliance on foreign funds and FX swaps became a priority, which curbed the lending 
appetite of banks, making the operation of the banking system procyclical. Although the 
number of new household loans also dropped significantly, it was primarily in corporate 
lending where the adjustment was most apparent. On the one hand, as corporate loans have 
shorter terms, the adjustment may be initially reflected in the loan segment with shorter 
maturities. On the other hand, corporate loans have lower profit margins than household 
loans. Finally, compared to retail mortgage loans, corporate loans have a higher risk 
weighting and therefore represent a greater burden on capital. 
As part of their adjustment strategy, market competition switched over from the asset side to 
the liability side. From the end of 2008, all major Hungarian banks began aggressive FX and 
HUF deposit-taking campaigns. As a result of fiercer deposit market competition, the banking 
system increased the propensity to save but at the same time drew a large amount of funds 
away from other forms of saving, primarily investment fund and cash-type savings 
instruments. Moreover, the state refinanced maturing HUF government securities (primarily 
from the IMF loan) in the first half of 2009. The liquidity released (investments in HUF 
government bonds) also flowed into the banking system in the form of deposits. All in all, 
both the asset and liability sides contributed to a decreasing LDR, with the deposit side 
nevertheless playing a more prominent role. BIS Papers No 54  217
 
 
Regarding the pace and composition of the balance sheet adjustment, there are strong 
differences between the two banking groups. Banks in foreign ownership primarily decreased 
their activity on the loan side in the area of corporate lending. Competition for retail deposits 
contributed to an even larger extent to improving the LDR than loan side adjustment. As a 
consequence of competition, foreign banks increased their share of household deposits and 
thus the market share of local banks fell further. 
The adjustment process of local banks differed from that of their foreign counterparts. 
Thanks to much lower initial levels, the LDR of local banks decreased less in absolute value 
and the structure of the decrease also differed. The adjustment for this group was mostly 
achieved through the inflow of deposits – mainly corporate and other funds (primarily 
originating from money market funds). In the case of local banks, the corporate loan portfolio 
did not decrease, while the household loan portfolio decreased only to a slight extent. 
Parallel to the fall in the LDR, the reliance of the Hungarian banking system on foreign 
funding gradually declined in 2009. In the case of foreign banks, the volume of foreign funds 
decreased, while the rate of parent bank funding increased. Without parent banks to rely on, 
local banks replaced renewable foreign funds with state loans. 
Adjustment to the liquidity crisis did not only lead to a lower LDR. As the adjustment primarily 
affected FX-based products both on the loan and deposit sides, the on-balance sheet open 
FX position of banks, and consequently their reliance on the swap market, also decreased. 
The fall in the swap stock was most apparent at local banks. By the end of 2009 – in large 
part thanks to the successful intervention by the central bank – the Hungarian swap market 
had stabilised; therefore, in parallel with the easing of liquidity tensions, interoperability 
between currencies also improved gradually. 
Both foreign and local banks accumulated sufficient liquidity reserves to buffer themselves 
against possible future shocks. The ratio of liquid assets to the balance sheet total had 
increased by over 10% by the end of 2008. 
From both a macroeconomic and financial stability perspective, it was essential to reduce 
liquidity and financing risks. The fact that banks adjusted excessively to liquidity risks 
presented a risk in itself. When liquidity risks materialised, cooperation between the 
government, the central bank and parent banks restrained an excessively rapid adjustment, 
thereby making it possible to avoid and mitigate financial acceleration and preventing the 
more than justified deepening of the recession. 
II.2.   Solvency in the spotlight 
By the beginning of 2009, liquidity tensions in the global financial system seemed to ease, 
while the adjustment process led to a deep global economic recession. Due to its high trade 
integration, Hungary “imported” the recession affecting developed countries, but the rapid, 
forced adjustment referred to in the previous section led to a more severe economic 
contraction than in other countries, due to the decreased leverage of all economic agents. 
In this radically changed financial and macroeconomic environment, many previously 
creditworthy firms suddenly found themselves cut off from funding and, furthermore, the 
narrowing of their main outlet markets led to a fall in demand for their products. The 
corporate loan portfolio thus began to deteriorate substantially for both banking groups. The 
extent of this deterioration in a relative sense was similar for both foreign-owned and local 
banks, but its level differed greatly. While for local banks, the ratio of corporate loans over 90 
days overdue was around 3%, this figure stood at almost 8% at the end of H1 2009 for 
foreign banks. 
The household loan portfolio also began deteriorating rapidly in 2009. The proportion of non-
performing or overdue loans first increased in March 2009. Due to increased loan interest 
rates and substantial depreciation, households – with no natural hedging against exchange 218  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
rate risks – were less and less able to repay their loans (Chart 20). Following the stabilisation 
of the financial markets, the portfolio quality was undermined by the labour market 
adjustment of companies, taking the form of real wage cuts and increasing unemployment. 
The discrepancy between the portfolio deterioration of the two banking groups was 
significant. The non-performing loan ratio of local banks was 4%, much lower than the 7% of 
foreign banks in mid-2009. This is only partially explained by the fact that a large portion of 
the non-performing loans of the local banking group was sold to their own debt collection 
financial corporations. 
Chart 20 
Ratio of loans over 90 days overdue to loan volume  
























































































































































































































Foreign banks Local banks
 
Source: MNB. 
One of the reasons for the discrepancy is that the loan-to-value (LTV) of local banks’ 
household loan portfolios is lower: in 2009, the average LTV of local banks was under 65%, 
while that of foreign banks exceeded 70% (Chart 21). The other factor is that local banks are 
less active in the home equity mortgage market: while local banks hold one third of the total 
market share for household real estate-backed loans, their share is less than 20% in the 
case of home equity mortgage loans. BIS Papers No 54  219
 
 
Chart 21  

































































































Foreign banks Local banks
 
Source: MNB. 
The crisis reduced the banking system’s profitability primarily through credit contraction, 
narrowing interest margins due to higher financing costs, and loan losses and lost interest 
revenues stemming from deteriorating loan portfolios. The crisis began to affect profitability in 
2008, with the banking system performing worse than in the previous quarter due to 
increased provisions. Despite this, both local and foreign-owned financial institutions closed 
with remarkably good results in an international comparison. Overall, foreign subsidiaries 
significantly outperformed the banking systems of their parent banks’ countries, because 
while 2008 was a year of banks breaking even or experiencing losses in western Europe, in 
Hungary banks continued to post a significant profit. In several cases, foreign bank groups 
owed all of their profit to their subsidiaries in central and eastern Europe (Chart 22). 220  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
Chart 22  


















































































































































































































































































Foreign banks Local banks
 
Note: The large shifts observed in the case of local banks (eg in 2006 or 2008) are due to one-off events. 
Source: MNB. 
Due to the losses expected as a result of the crisis, the capital position of institutions became 
a central issue everywhere, including in the Hungarian banking system. Not only was the 
capital adequacy indicator high overall in the Hungarian banking sector, but the partial 
reinvestment of 2008 profits and reduction in risk-weighted assets (RWA) due to the forced 
adjustment led to an improvement in this indicator during the crisis. This improvement 
primarily involved local banks, mainly due to their presence on the stock market and the 
higher capital adequacy expectations of investors (Chart 23). BIS Papers No 54  221
 
 
Chart 23  
































































































































































Prior to the 2008 crisis, Hungarian banks realised outstandingly high profits. The main source 
of bank income was rapid credit growth and wide interest margins. In addition to the strong 
demand for credit from households due to their positive income expectations, fast credit 
growth was also the result of strong loan supply pressure from banks. Competition between 
banks intensified and the increasing competition did not result in decreasing prices. Cost-
based competition was reflected in higher advertising spending and network building, while 
risk-based competition was reflected in the sales of increasingly risky products to 
increasingly risky customers. Interest margins remained high for an extended period 
precisely because of the weak price-based competition. 
All of this led to the accumulation of ever increasing risks, which came at the price of 
sustaining high profitability. Rapid credit growth significantly pushed up financing risks, 
reflected in an elevated loan-to-deposit ratio and a strong reliance on foreign funding and the 
FX swap market. At the same time, banks’ credit risks also increased due to the high level of 
indebtedness of households and mounting exchange rate exposure. Both foreign and local 
banks assumed substantial liquidity and credit risks. When comparing foreign and local 
banks, however, the latter had higher liquidity risks, while the former had higher credit risks. 222  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
Chart 24  
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Note: Values falling further from the centre of the web indicate an increase in risks. 
Source: MNB. 
Chart 25 
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Note: Values falling further from the centre of the web indicate an increase in risks. 
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Following the onset of the crisis in Hungary in October 2008, these risks materialised. Due to 
the liquidity crisis, banks had to rely on substantial external assistance, albeit temporarily. In 
the case of local banks, this was provided by the central banks and the state, while in the 
case of foreign banks, it was provided by parent banks. The materialisation of financing risks 
forced all banks to adjust to the situation and restrain their activities. The sharp economic 
slump – exacerbated by the adjustment of the Hungarian private sector and the banking 
system – led to the materialisation of credit risks, while lending losses started growing – at a 
faster pace at foreign banks than at local banks (Charts 24 and 25). 
The crisis showed that the higher the level of risk, the higher the real economic cost to the 
banking system to adjust to the shock. The 2008 financial crisis hit the Hungarian banking 
system, which had significant liquidity and credit risks, and Hungarian banks thus reacted 
with strong procyclical behaviour to the changed financial and macroeconomic environment. 
All of this, in conjunction with similarly procyclical fiscal and monetary policy, contributed to 
the Hungarian economy entering a deeper recession in 2009 than the rest of the region. In 
order to prevent or alleviate banks’ procyclical behaviour, these risks must be reduced and 
new types of risks must be prevented from developing. The Hungarian banking system 
should not be allowed to once again become the source of risks which exacerbate the 
negative effects of an external shock. 
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